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ABSTRACT 
 
The model of social network is used to analyze the impact of the power of labor unions in the 
labor relations. We find that labor union capable to affect a pecuniary compensation of 
shirking employees lessens the motivation of employees to work and improve to the 
unionization rate. As a result, the performance of the firm is significantly deteriorated and its 
existence endangered. On the other hand, the inspection proved to be a successful method for 
“motivating” employees to work. By using non-omniscient agents, we also estimated the cost 
of that non-omniscience, which proved to be significant in all cases.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Incentives can be defined as any action that provides motives for a particular behavior of 
individuals and represent a significant element in the decision-making processes of 
individuals. On the other hand, disincentives can be defined as any action that lessens motives 
for a particular behavior of individuals thus having negative motivational effects to 
individuals’ behavior. When deciding which action to pursue, individuals compare the gains 
they believe an action will bring them to the costs of an action and consider some risks on 
both sides, which they perceive relevant. Self-motivated individuals also tackle their 
preferences and other individual-specific characteristics to the feasibility constrains. 
Incentives and disincentives alter the feasibility constrain in the above cost-benefit analysis, 
which makes them very significant in the decision-making. Because incentives directly enter 
the cost-benefit analysis, they induce reallocation of activities towards those that are subject 
of an incentive and away from those that are not, or are subject of a disincentive (Holmstrom 
and Milgrom 1991; Baker 1992; Prendergast 1999; Jensen and Murphy 1990). The answer 
how incentives and disincentives induce moral hazard is not universal, as individuals differ in 
their preferences, knowledge, attitudes towards risk, ties in the social network and other 
individual-specific characteristics, whereas in the environment of Hayekian knowledge 
(Hayek 1945), individuals learn and pursue their rational self-interest. Schelling (1978) 
observes that such self-interests on an individual basis might have huge global effects, 
whereas Montgomery (1991) stresses the importance of social ties for the salary of 
employees.  
 
A significant element in the process of incentives and disincentives in industrial relations is 
represented by labor unions, which might have several different outcomes, and that question 
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we tackle in the paper. We extend the inspection game of Dresher (1962) by adding a labor 
union. Labor unions have yet not been introduced into the inspection game, although their 
influence in the labor relations could not be ignored. In the game, a principal (employer or a 
firm) employs an agent (or agents or employees or workers), and assigns a task to him for 
which the latter receives a payment, if the task successfully accomplished. The arrangement 
results in the well-known principal-agent problem, because the two participants have opposite 
interests (Grossman and Hart 1983; Mookherjee 1984). In particular, while the employer 
wants the task to be accomplished, the employee tries to receive his payment with as little 
effort as possible. The dilemma is tackled by a costly inspection going at the expense of the 
employer, and is intended to reveal the true effort of the employee. Employee that is caught 
shirking does not get paid, whereas he does not get fired. Therefore, in order to motivate 
agents to work, principal might increase the level of the inspection. Because of the 
communication processes among employees, principal does not need to inspect every single 
agent in order to “motivate” him to work. Therefore, we search for the optimal inspection rate 
of the principal. 
 
A simple labor union is introduced into the game as a potential escape hatch for shirking 
workers by warranting a partial pecuniary compensation for those unionized. The level of this 
compensation is exogenously determined in the model, and it directly determines benefits, 
which employees can get by joining the union. We could say that the level of this pecuniary 
compensation determines the power of the union. Such concept defines the union power in 
terms of the share of any “rent” captured by the union. Therefore, the decision to join the 
union or not interacts with the decision to shirk, and when deciding whether to join the union 
or not, employees weigh expected benefits with the established union-membership fee, and 
keep these expectations in mind (Hammermesh 1977). 
  4
 
The power a labor union has in the game can affect working incentives of selfish employees, 
which further affects the level of inspection done by a principal and the profitability of a firm. 
Clark (1984) and Freeman and Kleiner (1999) estimate that unionized firms, which operate in 
similar environment than non-unionized firms, are associated with 10 to 20 percent lower 
profits. As Freeman and Medoff (1984) state, the profitability effect is not present per se, but 
“what matter are the market conditions and routes by which unionism alters profits.” We find 
that under certain conditions labor union has quite a negligible impact on the work incentives 
of employees and on the performance of a firm. However, increasing its power has extremely 
negative effect on the working habits of employees, both union and non-union members, and 
the performance of the firm as well (DiNardo and Lee 2004). 
 
The principal-agent inspection game in the paper is simulated bottom-up, using a social 
network of many local and global interactions among individuals (Axelrod 1984; Milgram 
1967; Watts and Strogatz 1998; Wasserman and Faust 1994). With such social network, we 
consider the fact that workers in firms work together in small groups and communicate with 
each other by using different cognitive methods, that they become friends, while they also 
have acquaintances from other such groups. Workers in firms also daily meet at different 
occasions, e.g. at the workplace, at lunch, when coming to work and going home, etc. By 
connecting workers from such groups with their acquaintances and acquaintances of 
acquaintances and so on, we assume that workers from the entire firm are connected with 
such local acquaintances.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a short note on the social network that is 
used in the paper. In the Section 3, we develop the game in three different forms. In particular, 
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we analyze a baseline inspection game without labor union and two versions with a labor 
union; i.e. exogenously and endogenously determined. In Section 4, we apply the small world 
network to these three models, and analyze the results in the Section 5. In the Section 6, we 
give some conclusions. 
 
2. Small world network 
 
The network ( ),g A E=  is a set of vertices { }1 2, , , nA A A A= … , representing agents-
employees, and edges { }1 2, , , mE e e e= … , representing their unique pairwise connections. If 
two agents are connected, we denote ij g∈ , while ij g∉  represents two unconnected agents. 
Using adjacency matrix, 1ij =  if ij g∈  and 0ij =  if ij g∉ . We use undirected graph with no 
loops, where edges are unordered pairs of vertices and are either connected or not, thus if 
1 1ij ji= ⇔ =  and no 1ii =  is possible for all i N∈ . In a small world network, people have 
many local and some global connections with others, which we get by randomly rewiring 
some of the connections from a regular network at some small probability (Watts and Strogatz 
1998). The probability that a connection from an agent iA  is rewired to the randomly chosen 
agent jA  in the network equals 0.01p = . The number of agents to which an agent iA  is 
directly connected represents a degree of an agent iA  and is denoted ( )ik A . The average 
degree of agents in the network equals ( ) 6ik g = . The network remains unchanged once 
agents are populated and connections are rewired. There are no isolated agents in the network. 
 
3. The game 
 
3.1 General framework 
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We begin with a simple multi-agent inspection game. Owner of the firm, or a principal, 
denoted P , employs a nonempty, finite set of employees, or agents, denoted iA , where 
{ }1, 2, ,1000i = … . In every time period each agent has to choose between two discrete 
choices, to work, denoted with W , or shirk, denoted with S , which makes his set of pure 
strategies in every time period to be given as { }WSSi ,= . 
 
Each agent iA  contributes ( ) { }1,0∈∈ iii Ssv  to the total output with 1=iv  if working and 
0=iv , if not. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that workers are equally productive and 
do not allow for any kinds of stochastic production shocks. Then the total output of the firm 
equals to the sum of outputs of all individual agents, thus ( ){ }∑ ==
i
iii Wssvv | . Although 
principal could also observe the output value of the firm to monitor the efficiency of 
employees, we assume that costly inspection, denoted h , that is borne out by the principal, is 
the only way how a principal can reveal the true state of each agent. Principal thus have two 
alternatives from which to choose, to inspect { }I  or not { }N , making his set of pure strategies 
{ }NIS P ,= . 
 
We can now put the payoff function of each agent iA , Equation (1), and of the principal P , 
Equation (2), as  
 
( )| :i i P iu s s S →ℜ , (1) 
( ) ℜ→PiPP Sssu :| . (2) 
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Agent who is not found shirking gets payment w , no matter whether he was working or not. 
The level of payment is given in the relative terms as a share of produced output and is put 
exogenous into the model. This also means that the principal is not able to condition the level 
of wages according to the output. 
 
Let us imagine that working requires efforts, which is costly, for which agents are better off 
when not working. We neglect the fact that some agents might consider shirking less 
satisfactory than working, as von Mises (1949) argue. Therefore, if an agent iA  decides to 
work, his decision is a subject of work related costs whatever they are, which we denote with 
g . For the sake of simplicity, we assume homogeneous agents in this respect that all have 
equal opportunity costs, therefore 0>= ggi  for all Ni∈ .  
 
On the other side, principal not only decides whether to inspect or not, but also how much to 
inspect if he decides to inspect. Because inspection is subject to costs to the principal, we 
assume that a principal inspects each agent with the given probability [ ]1,0∈r , whereas the 
value of the probability is unknown to agents. Every level of probability that is lower than 
unity represents the incentive for agents to shirk on the hope not to be inspected. Recall that 
agent who is found for shirking gets 0=w . As long as the probability for inspection is unity, 
agents have dominant strategies to work. 
 
The time in the model is discrete defined on 1,2,3,...,t T= . During a single iteration of the 
game, each agent iA  communicates with other agents to which he is connected and plays the 
game with the principal P , where both choose their strategies simultaneously at the 
beginning of every time period. Depending on the choices they make, the two receive payoffs 
described succinctly by the payoffs matrix (Fudenberg and Tirole 1994): 
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 iA / P  I  N  
 S  h−/0  ww −/  
 W  hwvgw −−− /  wvgw −− /  
 
3.2 A one shot game 
 
In a one-shot game we assume that there is only one time period with 
( ) ( )00 >>∧>> hwgw , meaning that none of the strategies is weakly or strictly dominated. 
Under such circumstances, the game does not have Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.  
 
To prove the first part, let assume that 0>> wg . Then the payoff matrix applies that 
( ) ( ) PPPiPi SssWusSu ∈∀>> ,, , which indicates working to be strictly dominated strategy for 
an agent iA . Second part can be proved using the similar reasoning. Assume now that 
0>> wh , then the payoff matrix applies to ( ) ( ) iiiPiP SsIsuNsu ∈∀>> ,, , making the 
inspection strictly dominated strategy. 
 
Let Σ∈σ i  be a mixed strategy of an agent iA . Then the set of mixed strategies can be written 
as [ ] ( ) ⎭⎬⎫⎩⎨⎧ ∑ =σ→σ=Σ ∈ ii Ss iiiii sS 1,1,0| . Expected payoff of each agent iA  playing such mixed 
strategy ii Σ∈σ  then equals  
 
( ) ( ) ( )∑ ∏σ=σ
∈ ∈iSs Nj
iijjPi sussu | . (3) 
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Similar conditions hold true also for the principal P . We can put his set of mixed strategies as 
[ ] ( ) ⎭⎬⎫⎩⎨⎧ ∑ =σ→σ=Σ ∈ PP Ss PPPPP sS 1,1,0| , where the expected payoff from playing a mixed 
strategy PP Σ∈σ  is given by 
 
( ) ( ) ( )∑ ∏σ=σ
∈ ∈PSs Nj
PPjjiP sussu | . (4) 
 
We now turn to the best responses of each agent against the principal. Assume that r  is the 
probability that an agent iA  is inspected and that iα  is the probability that this agent is 
shirking. Then the expected payoff of an agent iA , when he plays { }ii α−α 1, , while a 
principal plays { }rr −1, , is  
 
[ ] ( ) ( )rwggwrAE iii −α+−=α ,| . (5) 
 
From the Equation (5), we see that the expected payoff of an agent iA  is increasing in iα  for 
( ) 0>− rwg  and decreasing elsewhere. Therefore, the correspondence of his best responses 
( )rBC  is defined as 
 
( )
{ } [ )
{ }
{ } ( ]⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
∈
=
∈
=
1,
,
,0
wgrW
wgrWS
wgrS
rBC . (6) 
 
3.3 A one shot game with a labor union 
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We now introduce a labor union into the game and are particularly interested in the effects a 
labor union induce on working habits of employees, wages, and the profitability of the firm. 
 
We still have a principal P  in the model who employs a nonempty and finite set of agents iA . 
However, we now assume that part of agents are unionized, we denote them u , while the rest 
of them ( )u−1  remain non-union members.1 We denote 1=iu  if an agent iA  is a union 
member and 0=iu  if he is not. To facilitate the notation, let ( ){ }1| == iiii uuAU  indicate a 
union member and ( ){ }0| == iiii uuAL  a non-union member. 
 
Unionization is not free of charge, but is subject of paying a membership fee, which is 
denoted f . Because membership fee goes at the expense of each union member iU , paying it 
per se lowers the utility of a member. Therefore, union members expect to get some benefits 
in return (Hammermesh 1977). We introduce the pecuniary compensation into the model, 
denoted [ ]1,0∈c , which a shirking union member receives if caught shirking. Pecuniary 
compensation represents the fraction of the wage w  that union members get although being 
caught by the principal P  while shirking. The level of such compensation represents a benefit 
of being unionized, while it also represents an incentive for union members not to work and 
for non-union members to become unionized. The level of this compensation could also 
reflect the power of a union, with higher the value more influential the labor union. 
 
We first consider the case where 1=iu  for all Ni∈ . Therefore, the strategy space of an agent 
iA  remains unaltered as each agent may still work or shirk. To facilitate the notation, let 
                                                 
1 Note that u  denotes utility as well. But it should be clear from the text whether in particular cases u  relates to 
utility or the unionization. 
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{ }WUSUSi ,= . The two alternatives of a principal are either to inspect or not, therefore 
{ }NIS P ,= . The new payoffs matrix is now of the following form 
 
 iU / P  I  N  
 SU  hcwfcw −−− /  wfw −− /  
 WU  hwvfgw −−−− /  wvfgw −−− /  
 
Let us derive general condition for the optimal strategy of a union member iU . When he 
plays { }ii α−α 1,  and the principal plays { }rr −1, , his expected payoff equals 
 
[ ] ( ) ( )( )crwgfwcrUE iii −−α+−=α 1,,| . (7) 
 
It is evident that the expected payoff of iU  is increasing in iα  if ( )( ) 01 >−− crwg  and 
decreasing elsewhere. Therefore, his best response correspondence ( )crBC |  is represented by 
 
( )
{ } ( )[ )
{ } ( )
{ } ( )( ]⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
−∈
−=
−∈
=
1,1
1,
1,0
|
cwgrWU
cwgrWUSU
cwgrSU
crBC . (8) 
 
We take some examples. We first assume a labor union with no power, therefore 0=c . In 
this case, the best response correspondence represented in Equation (8) reduces to Equation 
(6). However, notice that a union member iU  is worse off than non-union member iA , 
because he must pay a membership fee f , for which he does not get any benefit in return.  At 
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the other extreme case with a labor union of a maximum power, therefore 1=c , the best 
response strategy reduces to the { }SU  for any r  as ( )[ ] ∞→−= −→ 11 1lim cwgrc .  
 
3.4 Evolutionary inspection game 
 
We now extend the framework to the multi-stage setting and allow for a mutual cooperation 
of agents with each other as represented by the small world network principle. Suppose now 
that when agents receive the wage, they spend a part of it, while saving the rest. Let ( )1,0∈s  
be the savings rate, which is exogenously given to all agents. We may use such a 
simplification because we have homogeneous agents. Then the accumulated wealth of an 
agent  iA , denoted with ie , for the t -th iteration is calculated according to  
 
)()()(
1
0
tqhqste i
t
h
ii +∑=
−
=
. (9) 
 
In the Equation (9), )(hqi  and )(tqi  denote payoff of an agent iA  at iteration h  and t , 
respectively. 
 
After each agent in the network decides which strategy to pursue, he is rewarded with a 
payoff that contributes to his wealth. An important element in the game is the acquisition of 
knowledge, which agents adopt by communication processes with others in the network. We 
assume that agents not only learn from their own experiences, but also from experiences of 
others. Thus, we assume that when deciding which strategy to take, an agent iA  compares his 
accumulated wealth ie  and the strategy he played with the wealth and the strategy played by a 
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randomly chosen agent jA  to whom he is connected. The wealth of an agent jA  is denoted 
je . Such communication processes and the exchange of experiences among agents in the 
network affect the strategies agents take in the beginning of the next period, and so on. 
Because the network is fully connected with such interacting agents, information of individual 
agents circles around the whole network. Because of this feature, social networks usually 
imply herd behavior with strategies outperforming others usually being copied (Bikhchandani 
et al. 1998; Banerjee 1992). In the games, we assume that the quality of information does not 
weaken when circling through the network. 
 
We now introduce the level of omniscience of agents into the game. This means that when 
agents compare the outcomes of different strategies with theirs, there is a probability that they 
do not take the most efficient strategy of other agents. The probability that an agent iA  adopts 
the strategy of one of his randomly chosen neighbor jA  is an increasing function of the 
wealth difference, defined as follows (Szabó and Töke, 1998) 
 
( )( ) 111 exp i je e κ −−⎡ ⎤℘= + −⎣ ⎦ , (10) 
 
where 10 <<κ<  is the parameter of non-omniscience, which is related to the strategy 
adoption. Closer to zero the value of parameter κ , more omniscient agents are. More 
omniscient agents are, more likely it is that they adopt the strategy with highest outcome. 
Equation (10) also implies that closer the payoffs of the two agents, less likely it is for an 
agent iA  to change his strategy. This is something Aumann (1997), Rubinstein (1998) and 
Selten (1975) define as “trembling hand perfection.” This means that the strategy of better 
performing agent is likely to be copied, while it is not completely impossible that agents adopt 
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the strategy of a worse performing agent. However, when the difference between payoffs of 
the two agents is very small, such probability is higher, and vice versa. This is in line with a 
psychological approach to the decision-making problem of agents (Kahneman and Tversky 
1979; Kahneman 2003; Hirshleifer 2001). 
 
3.5 Evolutionary inspection game with exogenous labor union 
 
Consider now that iU  and iL  are nonempty finite sets of agents that are members of union 
and non-union members, whereas the level of unionization is exogenously given before the 
first iteration. Once unionization statuses are defined, such agents are not allowed to change 
it. The new payoffs matrix has the form 
 
 iA / P  I  N  
 S  h−/0  ww −/  
 W  hwvgw −−− /  wvgw −− /  
 SU  hcwfcw −−− /  wfw −− /  
 WU  hwvfgw −−−− /  wvfgw −−− /  
 
Here, the strategy space for each non-union-member iL  equals { }WS , , where the strategy 
space of each union-member iU  equals { }WUSU , . As before, the principal still has two 
choices available, whether to inspect or not, therefore { }NI , . 
 
3.6 Evolutionary inspection game with endogenous labor union 
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We now make the labor union status endogenous. This means that along with the strategy 
adoption, each agent is also allowed to adopt unionization status of other agent. Under this 
circumstances, agents have four different alternatives available; { }WUSUWSSi ,,,= . 
Because of ( ) ( ) 0,, >∀∧∈∀>> fSssWUusWu PPPiPi , WU  is strictly dominated strategy 
and is never played, for which the payoffs matrix can be reduced to 
 
 iA / P  I  N  
 S  h−/0  ww −/  
 W  hwvgw −−− /  wvgw −− /  
 SU  hcwfcw −−− /  wfw −− /  
 
We also assume that the opportunity cost of labor is strictly higher than the unionization fee, 
therefore fg >> . For the opportunity cost of labor being lower than the unionization fee, 
SU  is strictly dominated strategy for an agent iA , as ( ) ( ), ,i P i Pu W s u SU s>>  for all P Ps S∈  
and for all [ ]0,1c∈ . 
 
4. Simulation 
 
Simulation process is given as follows. The model is populated with 1000=n  agents, each of 
which initially has ( ) 6=gki  connections. The probability that a connection of an agent iA  is 
rewired to the randomly chosen agent jA  in the network, equals 1.0=p . Once connections 
between agents are rewired and agents populated throughout the network, the network 
remains unchanged. 
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All inspection games are iterated forward in time, using a synchronous update scheme. With 
this, we let all agents to strike a deal with the principal according to the ascribed parameters 
and the probability r  for principal to inspect. Throughout the game, agents simultaneously 
update their strategies, by considering the level of their non-omniscience according to the 
Equation (10).  
 
In the simulations below, we set the output level of each agent v  to unity, and adjust all other 
values accordingly in relative terms. In particular, each working agent earns 4.0=w  and 
bears opportunity and other work related costs 1250.g = . We assume that workers save 10  
percent of their wage, thus 040.s = , while the union membership fee equals 5  percent of the 
wage, thus 020.f = . Moreover, each inspection costs the principal 16.0=h , and the factor 
of non-omniscience in the strategy adoption equals 0.1κ = . Unionization rate, where 
applicable, equals 4.0=u  and unionized agents are always randomly scattered in the network 
amongst non-union agents. In the version of exogenous labor unions, those agents that are 
union members retain that status through the whole game, while agents are free to change 
their status under endogenous setting. The time is set to 100.000T = . 
 
To analyze the impact of small perturbations of r  and c  to the solution of the inspection 
game, we use the step of 02.0  units throughout the definition space ]1,0[  of both variables. 
Figures represent the averages of 20  independent realizations of games. 
 
5. Results 
 
5.1 Evolutionary inspection game without labor union 
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Firm’s performance 
 
We first simulate the game without the labor union, which means that the first payoffs matrix 
applies. Figure 1 presents an equilibrium solution of the game. It shows the average firm 
performance per iteration π , subject to the probability rate of the inspection  r .  
 
FIGURE 1: Optimal inspection rate and firm profit 
 
 
 
Figure 1 shows that it is optimal for the principal P  to set the inspection rate at 4.0=r  in 
order to maximize the work incentives of workers and his profit. In this case, as simulation 
predicts, all agents work, since ( ) { }{ }⎩⎨
⎧
<
≥=
4.0;
4.0;
rS
rW
rsi . This means that principal does not need 
to inspect every agent in order to make sure that everyone is working.  
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To calculate the average profit of the firm with respect to the probability of an inspection 
( )rπ , we use a corresponding payoffs matrix. Profit equals total revenues less total costs 
borne by the principal, that is ( ) hnwnvnr 321 −−=π . Here, 1n  denoted the number of workers 
working, 2n  the number of workers receiving the wage w , and 3n  the number of workers that 
are inspected. Let us make one example. For 34.0=r , optimal decision rule for an agent iA  
is to shirk in the equilibrium, thus, 01 =n . 34.0=r  means that principal P  inspects 
3403 =n  agents out of 1000  (34 percent of the agents in the network) and they all are caught 
shirking. This means that 6602 =n  agents are working. Putting all this together, we get the 
loss of the firm of ( ) 4.31834.0 −==π r  units. All remaining analytical results and simulation 
results are given in Table 1. 
 
TABLE 1: Firm’s profit as a function of inspection rate 
 
r  ( )rSπ  ( )rAπ  ERR  r  ( )rSπ  ( )rAπ  ERR  r  ( )rSπ  ( )rAπ  ERR  
0 -400 -400 0 0.34 -318.414 -318.4 -4.3E-05 0.68 491.2015 491.2 -3E-06 
0.02 -395.202 -395.2 -3.9E-06 0.36 -313.599 -313.6 4.15E-06 0.7 488.0066 488 -1.3E-05 
0.04 -390.393 -390.4 1.73E-05 0.38 -308.802 -308.8 -5E-06 0.72 484.7876 484.8 2.57E-05 
0.06 -385.606 -385.6 -1.5E-05 0.4 536.0058 536 -1.1E-05 0.74 481.5937 481.6 1.3E-05 
0.08 -380.797 -380.8 9.11E-06 0.42 532.7909 532.8 1.7E-05 0.76 478.3979 478.4 4.47E-06 
0.1 -375.995 -376 1.32E-05 0.44 529.6029 529.6 -5.4E-06 0.78 475.21 475.2 -2.1E-05 
0.12 -371.21 -371.2 -2.6E-05 0.46 526.4099 526.4 -1.9E-05 0.8 472.0014 472 -3E-06 
0.14 -366.389 -366.4 2.99E-05 0.48 523.2093 523.2 -1.8E-05 0.82 468.7939 468.8 1.3E-05 
0.16 -361.599 -361.6 2.9E-06 0.5 519.9959 520 7.98E-06 0.84 465.607 465.6 -1.5E-05 
0.18 -356.781 -356.8 5.4E-05 0.52 516.8062 516.8 -1.2E-05 0.86 462.3975 462.4 5.47E-06 
0.2 -352.001 -352 -3.5E-06 0.54 513.5913 513.6 1.69E-05 0.88 459.2019 459.2 -4.2E-06 
0.22 -347.206 -347.2 -1.7E-05 0.56 510.4008 510.4 -1.5E-06 0.9 455.9985 456 3.33E-06 
0.24 -342.392 -342.4 2.25E-05 0.58 507.1889 507.2 2.2E-05 0.92 452.7938 452.8 1.37E-05 
0.26 -337.599 -337.6 3.61E-06 0.6 503.9934 504 1.31E-05 0.94 449.6084 449.6 -1.9E-05 
0.28 -332.805 -332.8 -1.6E-05 0.62 500.7986 500.8 2.76E-06 0.96 446.3995 446.4 1.12E-06 
0.3 -328.004 -328 -1.4E-05 0.64 497.5991 497.6 1.83E-06 0.98 443.2006 443.2 -1.3E-06 
0.32 -323.188 -323.2 3.84E-05 0.66 494.401 494.4 -1.9E-06 1 440 440 0 
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In the table [ ]1,0∈r  denotes the inspection rate, ( )rSπ  denotes the simulation results of the 
firm profit ( )rπ , ( )rAπ  denotes to the analytical solution, and ERR  measures the relative 
error, which is the difference between the simulation result and the analytical result. Profit of 
the firm in the optimum equals ( ) 5364.0 ==π r . However, it is not Pareto efficient. If all 
agents had behaved omnisciently, then all would have worked already at the 3125.0=r .2 
Such behavior would have resulted in lower inspection costs and consequently in higher profit 
for the principal, as ( ) 5503125.0 ==π∗ r . This is 6.2  percent higher than the best 
equilibrium solution. This difference reflects the effect of non-omniscient behavior of agents, 
which can be defines as the cost of non-omniscience. 
 
Agent’s performance 
 
Simulation implies an optimal strategy for an agent, which is ( ) { }{ }⎩⎨
⎧
<
≥=
4.0;
4.0;
rS
rW
rsi . However, 
Equation (6) predicts an optimal strategy for an agent to be ( ) { } [ ){ }3125.0,0| ∈= rSrsi  and 
( ) { } ( ]{ }1,3125.0| ∈= rWrsi  with the point of indifference at 3125.0=r . From this 
difference, we see that the non-omniscience of agents affects the payoff of agents even more 
than that of the firm.  
 
We now calculate the average utility of an agent iA  by using corresponding payoffs matrix. 
We get it from ( ) gmwmrui 21 −= , where 1m  is the probability that a worker receives a wage 
w , while 2m  measures the average time an agent iA  is working. For instance, for 34.0=r  
optimal decision rule for agent iA  predicts that he will shirk in the equilibrium, thus, 02 =m . 
                                                 
2 This results from the analytical solution of the Equation (6). 
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34.0=r  denotes a 34  percent chance that principal P  inspects agent iA , who is caught 
while shirking. Therefore, we get 66.01 =m . When putting all this together, we get 
( ) 264.034.0 ==rui . Results of the simulations and the rest of analytical results are shown in 
Table 2.  
 
TABLE 2: Agent’s utility as a function of inspection rate 
 
r  ( )ru Si  ( )ru Ai  ERR  r  ( )ru Si  ( )ru Ai  ERR  r  ( )ru Si  ( )ru Ai  ERR  
0 0.400 0.400 0 0.34 0.2640138 0.264 5.21E-05 0.68 0.2749985 0.275 -5.3E-06 
0.02 0.3920016 0.392 3.98E-06 0.36 0.2559987 0.256 -5.1E-06 0.7 0.2749934 0.275 -2.4E-05 
0.04 0.3839932 0.384 -1.8E-05 0.38 0.2480015 0.248 6.17E-06 0.72 0.2750124 0.275 4.52E-05 
0.06 0.3760059 0.376 1.56E-05 0.4 0.2749942 0.275 -2.1E-05 0.74 0.2750063 0.275 2.28E-05 
0.08 0.3679965 0.368 -9.4E-06 0.42 0.2750091 0.275 3.29E-05 0.76 0.2750021 0.275 7.78E-06 
0.1 0.359995 0.360 -1.4E-05 0.44 0.2749971 0.275 -1E-05 0.78 0.27499 0.275 -3.6E-05 
0.12 0.352.098 0.352 2.78E-05 0.46 0.2749901 0.275 -3.6E-05 0.8 0.2749986 0.275 -5.1E-06 
0.14 0.343989 0.344 -3.2E-05 0.48 0.2749907 0.275 -3.4E-05 0.82 0.2750061 0.275 2.22E-05 
0.16 0.335999 0.336 -3.1E-06 0.5 0.2750042 0.275 1.51E-05 0.84 0.274993 0.275 -2.5E-05 
0.18 0.3279807 0.328 -5.9E-05 0.52 0.2749938 0.275 -2.2E-05 0.86 0.2750025 0.275 9.2E-06 
0.2 0.3200012 0.320 3.81E-06 0.54 0.2750087 0.275 3.16E-05 0.88 0.2749981 0.275 -7E-06 
0.22 0.3120061 0.312 1.95E-05 0.56 0.2749992 0.275 -2.8E-06 0.9 0.2750015 0.275 5.53E-06 
0.24 0.3039923 0.304 -2.5E-05 0.58 0.2750112 0.275 4.05E-05 0.92 0.2750062 0.275 2.26E-05 
0.26 0.2959988 0.296 -4.1E-06 0.6 0.2750066 0.275 2.4E-05 0.94 0.2749916 0.275 -3.1E-05 
0.28 0.2880054 0.288 1.86E-05 0.62 0.2750014 0.275 5.02E-06 0.96 0.2750005 0.275 1.82E-06 
0.3 0.2800044 0.280 1.59E-05 0.64 0.2750009 0.275 3.31E-06 0.98 0.2749994 0.275 -2.1E-06 
0.32 0.2719876 0.272 -4.6E-05 0.66 0.2749991 0.275 -3.5E-06 1 0.275 0.275 0 
 
Here r  is the inspection rate probability, ( )ru Si  represents simulation results, ( )ru Ai  
represents the analytical result and ERR  is a relative error again. We see that for 34.0=r , 
agents get inferior outcome, which is due to their level of non-omniscience. Because 
( ) 275.0==Wsu ii  for all [ ]1,0∈r , any strategy that would result in lower utility would not 
be optimal. Hence, for ( ) 275.0<rui , we have a strict preference relation SW ;; . 
Equilibrium solutions of agents in the range of [ ]38.0,32.0∈r  are thus suboptimal, as they 
  21
could attain higher utility if they had perfect knowledge, as the guaranteed utility value is 
275.0=iu . Therefore, the difference again denotes the cost of non-omniscience of agents. 
 
5.2 Evolutionary inspection game with labor union 
 
Firm’s performance 
 
We now introduce exogenous labor union into the model. We first study the performance of 
the firm, with its profit (color coded in the figure) being a function of inspection rate and the 
power of labor union, ( )cr,π and show the simulation results in Figure 2.  
 
FIGURE 2: The average income of the firm when unionization is fixed 
 
 
 
For 0=c , theoretical model simplifies to the baseline model. Results of the simulation are 
shown in Table 3 (columns ( )0,rSπ ) and, as predicted, nearly replicate those from the Table 
1. 0=c  indicates the labor union that has no power to influence the level of a pecuniary 
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compensation received by the shirking workers. Therefore, it is also not able to influence on 
the working habits of workers.  
 
TABLE 3: Firm’s profit as a function of inspection rate with 0=c  and 1=c  
 
r  ( )0,rSπ  ( )1,rSπ  r  ( )0,rSπ  ( )1,rSπ  r  ( )0,rSπ  ( )1,rSπ  
0 -400 -400 0.34 -318.42317 -372.569 0.68 491.19853 -113.686 
0.02 -395.20083 -398.425 0.36 -313.60581 -371.11 0.7 488.00791 -66.5564 
0.04 -390.39762 -396.812 0.38 -308.80256 -368.393 0.72 484.80347 -14.9423 
0.06 -385.58618 -395.084 0.4 536.00323 -369.123 0.74 481.60481 -15.133 
0.08 -380.8047 -393.701 0.42 532.78161 -364.719 0.76 478.39913 60.30182 
0.1 -376.00264 -391.899 0.44 529.60345 -363.421 0.78 475.19648 65.66602 
0.12 -371.20784 -390.337 0.46 526.39823 -365.034 0.8 472.00371 96.42518 
0.14 -366.42701 -388.127 0.48 523.19696 -361.358 0.82 468.79724 107.7686 
0.16 -361.59952 -387.325 0.5 520.00213 -359.373 0.84 465.60231 147.6994 
0.18 -356.80424 -385.611 0.52 516.77261 -359.893 0.86 462.39441 177.4516 
0.2 -351.99001 -383.383 0.54 513.59462 -357.653 0.88 459.19323 199.3029 
0.22 -347.17982 -382.023 0.56 510.39575 -356.734 0.9 456.0032 191.5415 
0.24 -342.40118 -380.497 0.58 507.19789 -353.559 0.92 452.79636 198.4991 
0.26 -337.61035 -379.132 0.6 504.0069 -322.223 0.94 449.59776 224.7047 
0.28 -332.79298 -377.815 0.62 500.80268 -228.407 0.96 446.40195 222.2397 
0.3 -327.98289 -376.456 0.64 497.60059 -204.786 0.98 443.20104 221.3987 
0.32 -323.20751 -375.038 0.66 494.38826 -166.661 1 440 255.6478 
 
To illustrate the influence of the power of the labor union, we examine the case 1=c , 
meaning that shirking workers are fully compensated if being union members. This is 
presented in ( )1,rSπ  columns in the Table 3. It is evident that in this case the performance of 
the firm deteriorates significantly. Namely, workers, both unionized and non-unionized, 
become more prone to shirking, inducing the principal more costs of inspection. The reason 
for that is that in choosing the strategy to play, non-unionized workers compare also strategies 
of the unionized workers, who are more likely to shirk. Despite non-unionized workers are 
not allowed to adopt the unionized status from unionized workers, they are free to adopt the 
strategy of shirking from a unionized workers if they see it beneficial. Therefore, at the 
optimal level of inspection at 1=r , only 78.7 percent of all workers work in the equilibrium, 
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resulting in the profit of the firm to be ( ) 65.2551,1 =π S . This is a little more than 58 percent 
of the profit that firm gets in ( ) 4400,1 =π S , and a little less than 48 percent of the profit when 
comparing with the optimal solution ( ) 5360,4.0 =π S . 
 
Agent’s performance 
 
We now turn to the performance of agents and first assume 0=c . Table 4 depicts results of 
simulations. 
 
TABLE 4: Agent’s utility when 0=c  
 
r  ( )ru Si  ( )ruUi  ( )ru Li  r  ( )ru Si  ( )ruUi  ( )ru Li  r  ( )ru Si  ( )ruUi  ( )ru Li  
0 0.3921426 0.38 0.4 0.34 0.2560632 0.244023 0.264023 0.68 0.2667815 0.255001 0.275001 
0.02 0.3840234 0.372001 0.392001 0.36 0.2481008 0.236006 0.256006 0.7 0.2670871 0.254992 0.274992 
0.04 0.3761476 0.363998 0.383998 0.38 0.2401252 0.228003 0.248003 0.72 0.2669141 0.254997 0.274997 
0.06 0.3678712 0.355986 0.375986 0.4 0.2668868 0.254997 0.274997 0.74 0.2668778 0.254995 0.274995 
0.08 0.3603021 0.348005 0.368005 0.42 0.2671108 0.255018 0.275018 0.76 0.2670883 0.255001 0.275001 
0.1 0.35204 0.340003 0.360003 0.44 0.2670192 0.254997 0.274997 0.78 0.2669809 0.255004 0.275004 
0.12 0.3441328 0.332008 0.352008 0.46 0.2668792 0.255002 0.275002 0.8 0.2669437 0.254996 0.274996 
0.14 0.336307 0.324027 0.344027 0.48 0.266938 0.255003 0.275003 0.82 0.2669804 0.255003 0.275003 
0.16 0.3280069 0.316 0.336 0.5 0.2670505 0.254998 0.274998 0.84 0.2670377 0.254998 0.274998 
0.18 0.3201192 0.308004 0.328004 0.52 0.26692 0.255027 0.275027 0.86 0.267023 0.255006 0.275006 
0.2 0.3122924 0.29999 0.31999 0.54 0.2672654 0.255005 0.275005 0.88 0.2670042 0.255007 0.275007 
0.22 0.3038824 0.29198 0.31198 0.56 0.2669917 0.255004 0.275004 0.9 0.2669268 0.254997 0.274997 
0.24 0.2959962 0.284001 0.304001 0.58 0.2669371 0.255002 0.275002 0.92 0.2667586 0.255004 0.275004 
0.26 0.2881478 0.27601 0.29601 0.6 0.2669705 0.254993 0.274993 0.94 0.2670096 0.255002 0.275002 
0.28 0.280013 0.267993 0.287993 0.62 0.2671649 0.254997 0.274997 0.96 0.2672655 0.254998 0.274998 
0.3 0.2720503 0.259983 0.279983 0.64 0.267132 0.254999 0.274999 0.98 0.266959 0.254999 0.274999 
0.32 0.2641625 0.252008 0.272008 0.66 0.2673117 0.255012 0.275012 1 0.2671374 0.255 0.275 
 
In the Table 4, r  denotes the probability that the principal P  inspects an agent iA , ( )ru Si  is 
the average utility of both union and non-union members, ( )ruUi  is the average utility of 
unionized worker iU , and ( )ru Li  is the average utility of non-unionized worker, iL . It is 
evident from the simulation that unionized workers are always worse off than non-unionized. 
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As unionized workers do not get any benefit if the union has no power, this happens for 
0=c , this difference occurs due to paying a strictly positive unionization membership fee, 
0>>f .  
 
On the other extreme, we have the case of a powerful union with the value 1=c . This means 
that unionized workers are fully compensated if caught for shirking. Simulation results are 
given in Table 5. 
 
TABLE 5: Agent’s utility when 1=c  
 
r  ( )rui  ( )ruUi  ( )ru Li  r  ( )rui  ( )ruUi  ( )ru Li  r  ( )rui  ( )ruUi  ( )ru Li  
0 0.39213 0.38 0.4 0.34 0.310202 0.38 0.263983 0.68 0.255352 0.360196 0.184945 
0.02 0.387173 0.38 0.392007 0.36 0.305525 0.38 0.25603 0.7 0.256808 0.355097 0.191077 
0.04 0.382394 0.38 0.383996 0.38 0.299753 0.38 0.248014 0.72 0.259131 0.349286 0.199278 
0.06 0.377574 0.38 0.375987 0.4 0.296983 0.38 0.240004 0.74 0.257683 0.348594 0.195931 
0.08 0.372836 0.38 0.367994 0.42 0.289719 0.38 0.231998 0.76 0.260372 0.339449 0.209815 
0.1 0.367947 0.38 0.35999 0.44 0.285178 0.38 0.22401 0.78 0.260605 0.337656 0.209264 
0.12 0.363167 0.38 0.352016 0.46 0.283234 0.38 0.21599 0.8 0.26025 0.331744 0.212736 
0.14 0.357967 0.38 0.343999 0.48 0.276583 0.38 0.207996 0.82 0.260778 0.330184 0.214436 
0.16 0.353683 0.38 0.335982 0.5 0.271435 0.38 0.199995 0.84 0.263429 0.324294 0.223399 
0.18 0.348808 0.38 0.328002 0.52 0.268551 0.38 0.192017 0.86 0.262852 0.317812 0.227099 
0.2 0.34354 0.38 0.320021 0.54 0.263173 0.38 0.183981 0.88 0.263462 0.313885 0.231242 
0.22 0.33891 0.38 0.312012 0.56 0.258997 0.38 0.175988 0.9 0.262543 0.313879 0.228372 
0.24 0.334162 0.38 0.304015 0.58 0.252762 0.38 0.167978 0.92 0.263802 0.312818 0.230921 
0.26 0.329547 0.38 0.296016 0.6 0.251408 0.378077 0.166125 0.94 0.264365 0.307188 0.235951 
0.28 0.324977 0.38 0.288007 0.62 0.254283 0.371299 0.177362 0.96 0.264577 0.307699 0.235918 
0.3 0.320378 0.38 0.279985 0.64 0.253126 0.369173 0.176002 0.98 0.263973 0.305674 0.234527 
0.32 0.315738 0.38 0.271996 0.66 0.254842 0.3656 0.17906 1 0.264932 0.299194 0.242126 
 
We use the same notation as in Table 4. Results demonstrate that in the case of 1=c , union 
members almost surely outperform non-unionized workers. It is to be expected that if non-
unionized workers had had an opportunity to become a union member, they would have 
eagerly do that and shirk for any [ ]1,06.0∈r , where their cost-benefit analysis would show 
that union-related benefits outweigh the costs of the membership, f . 
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To present the influence of labor union on working habits of workers, we present the share of 
unionized workers who decide to work, UU wi , , and the share of those non-unionized 
workers who decide to work, LL wi , , respectively. ( )( )∑ == =
n
i
iii uuAU
1
1|  is a set of unionized 
workers and ( )( )∑ ==
=
n
i
iii uuAL
1
0|  is a set of non-unionized workers and in both cases a 
subscript W  relates to those who are working. Figure 3 depicts the share of agents that work 
within both groups (unionized and non-unionized) when 1=c .  
 
FIGURE 3: UU wi ,  and LL wi ,  
 
 
Shaded area in the figure indicates the difference between the relative share of union-
members who are working (bottom line) and the relative share of non-union-members who 
are working as well (upper line). The picture reveals that unionized workers are more prone to 
shirking than non-unionized workers are. Since unionized workers are fully compensated for 
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shirking, this is as expected. However, in the case of the full inspection, where 1=r , more 
than 60 percent of unionized workers are working in the equilibrium although they are fully 
compensated for shirking, which is surprising.  
 
5.3 Evolutionary inspection game with endogenous labor union 
 
Finally, we relax the assumption of exogenously determined unionization status and make it 
endogenous. This means that when an agent iA  decides, which strategy of an agent jA  to 
adopt, he does not only consider the strategy he takes, but also the unionization status of an 
agent.  
 
Firm’s performance 
 
Figure 4 depicts the performance of the firm (color coded) as a function of the inspection rate 
and compensation rate, ( )cr,π . In the Table 6 we see that the maximum attained profit equals 
( ) [ ]{ } 53626.0,04.0|, =∈∧=π=π crcr  units. This is the same as in the no unionization case, 
( )rπ  in Table 1. However, for c  approaching 1, the performance of the firm deteriorates 
significantly and in a case ( ) 5601,1 −===π cr  it suffers a loss of 560  units. This is because 
no one works in the equilibrium, while principal is obliged to pay wages to the agents. Of 
course, such firm is incapable of surviving in the long run and is likely to go bankrupt. 
 
FIGURE 4: The average income of the firm when unionization is not fixed 
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TABLE 6: Firm’s profit as a function of inspection rate with 0=c  and 1=c  
 
r  ( )0,rSπ  ( )1,rSπ  r  ( )0,rSπ  ( )1,rSπ  r  ( )0,rSπ  ( )1,rSπ  
0 -400 -400 0.34 -318.39406 -454.40098 0.68 491.19724 -508.80282 
0.02 -395.19664 -395.19641 0.36 -313.58888 -457.60955 0.7 487.98949 -511.99315 
0.04 -390.3963 -390.39536 0.38 -308.82458 -460.80293 0.72 484.79725 -515.19845 
0.06 -385.60074 -385.60082 0.4 535.99896 -463.98951 0.74 481.59888 -518.39487 
0.08 -380.79271 -380.78985 0.42 532.80465 -467.20759 0.76 478.40308 -521.58528 
0.1 -376.00013 -415.99823 0.44 529.59258 -470.39368 0.78 475.19713 -524.80106 
0.12 -371.20487 -419.19994 0.46 526.39438 -473.60333 0.8 471.99057 -527.99664 
0.14 -366.39383 -422.3977 0.48 523.19049 -476.7758 0.82 468.81289 -531.19181 
0.16 -361.59437 -425.60253 0.5 519.98211 -479.98721 0.84 465.60043 -534.40178 
0.18 -356.79382 -428.79709 0.52 516.81303 -483.19938 0.86 462.39849 -537.60126 
0.2 -351.98737 -432.00354 0.54 513.59567 -486.3976 0.88 459.20009 -540.80515 
0.22 -347.1803 -435.20227 0.56 510.41327 -489.60337 0.9 456.00296 -544.00109 
0.24 -342.38659 -438.39881 0.58 507.18891 -492.79809 0.92 452.79736 -547.19967 
0.26 -337.5918 -441.60554 0.6 504.01756 -496.01101 0.94 449.59835 -550.3998 
0.28 -332.80126 -444.79377 0.62 500.81351 -499.19728 0.96 446.39617 -553.598 
0.3 -328.00458 -447.99963 0.64 497.60529 -502.40141 0.98 443.19919 -556.79996 
0.32 -323.20204 -451.21198 0.66 494.4136 -505.60043 1 440 -560 
 
Agent’s performance 
 
Figure 5 illustrates a fraction of non-unionized (left picture) and unionized workers (right 
picture) who work within non-unionized and unionized workers.  
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FIGURE 5: Fractions of agents that work in the firm with non-constant union membership 
 
 
 
As predicted, unionized workers never work in the equilibrium. The reason for that is that 
WU  is strictly dominated strategy for all [ ]1,0, ∈cr . In the case 0=c , model simplifies to 
the one without labor union and the first payoffs matrix applies. In the equilibrium, no worker 
is unionized and { }=U  is an empty set for all [ ]1,0∈r . Such solution is a consequence of 
the fact that the unionization status is a subject of paying a strictly positive unionization fee 
0>>f , borne out by every unionization worker, and brings no benefits.  
 
In the case 1=c , the strategy of each agent to work is strictly dominated for all [ ]1,0∈r . 
However, in such situation it is not always optimal for agents to become unionized. Table 7 
depicts the utility of each agent in the game. Here r  denotes to the probability that principal 
will inspect, ( )1,ru Si  denotes a utility of an agent iA , and { }1,0∈iu  is a binary variable, which 
denotes a unionization status. If an agent is unionized 1=iu , and 0=iu  if he is not.  
 
TABLE 7: Agent’s utility as a function of [ ]1,0∈r  when 1=c  
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r  ( )uru Si ,1,  { }1,0∈iu  r  ( )uru Si ,1,  { }1,0∈iu  r  ( )uru Si ,1,  { }1,0∈iu  
0 0.400 0 0.34 0.380001 1 0.68 0.3800028 1 
0.02 0.3919964 0 0.36 0.3800096 1 0.7 0.3799932 1 
0.04 0.3839954 0 0.38 0.3800029 1 0.72 0.3799985 1 
0.06 0.3760008 0 0.4 0.3799895 1 0.74 0.3799949 1 
0.08 0.3679899 0 0.42 0.3800076 1 0.76 0.3799853 1 
0.1 0.3799982 1 0.44 0.3799937 1 0.78 0.3800011 1 
0.12 0.3799999 1 0.46 0.3800033 1 0.8 0.3799966 1 
0.14 0.3799977 1 0.48 0.3799758 1 0.82 0.3799918 1 
0.16 0.3800025 1 0.5 0.3799872 1 0.84 0.3800018 1 
0.18 0.3799971 1 0.52 0.3799994 1 0.86 0.3800013 1 
0.2 0.3800035 1 0.54 0.3799976 1 0.88 0.3800052 1 
0.22 0.3800023 1 0.56 0.3800034 1 0.9 0.3800011 1 
0.24 0.3799988 1 0.58 0.3799981 1 0.92 0.3799997 1 
0.26 0.3800055 1 0.6 0.380011 1 0.94 0.3799998 1 
0.28 0.3799938 1 0.62 0.3799973 1 0.96 0.379998 1 
0.3 0.3799996 1 0.64 0.3800014 1 0.98 0.380 1 
0.32 0.380012 1 0.66 0.3800004 1 1 0.380 1 
 
For 06.0=r  and 08.0=r , a fully omniscient agent are better off than a non-omniscient 
agent from the simulation. Because the minimum level of utility that each fully omniscient 
agent can get is ( ) 38.01,1, =rui  for all [ ]1,0∈r . This result is strictly higher than  
( ) 376.01,1,06.0 =iu  and ( ) 368.01,1,08.0 =iu . Again, this is the cost of non-omniscience of 
agents. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
In the paper, we applied small world network to the modified principal-agent inspection 
game, to which we included a labor union that appears as a potential escape hatch for shirking 
unionized workers. We were particularly interested how the power of a labor union influences 
working habits of employees, and thereby the performance of the firm. We get some inspiring 
results.  
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The presence of a labor union per se does not have an impact on the output of the firm. 
However, powerful labor unions that are capable to arrange for a fully compensation of 
shirking unionized workers by the firm, significantly enter the work/shirk tradeoff in favor of 
shirking and increased unionization rates, altering the efficiency of the firm significantly. In 
particular, if the benefits accruing from the power of a labor union exceed the costs of a 
membership, then adopting strategies that encourage unionization can increase the utility of 
agents, while they lower the utility of the firm. On the other hand, agents are not motivated to 
join the labor union if benefits of being unionized do not outweigh the costs. Our findings are 
in line with Black and Lynch (2001), who argue, that the effect of labor unions in the 
economy is not given but depends highly on the specific economic and labor relations 
environment in which unions operate. In the paper, this is represented through the level of 
pecuniary compensation to the shirking unionized workers.  
 
Simulations proved that the inspection could be an efficient method, by which principal can 
make workers to work. Simulations also showed that it is not necessary to inspect every single 
worker in order to “motivate” him to work. However, as the power of the labor unions is 
increasing, this also forces principal to increase the level of inspection, which raise the costs 
of a firm and reduces the utility and the profits of a firm. 
 
By using non-omniscient agents, we also estimated the costs of non-omniscience of workers, 
which can explain the “out-of-equilibrium” solutions. We find that the cost to be very 
significant for both, employees and the firm. 
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